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Tocqueville's Typology and the Causes of the 
Cuban Revolution 
RJ\YMOND RIMKUS 
Queens College 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The France in which Tocqueville lived was one of extreme political 
instability. The Revolution had ended the Ancien Regime, but neither 
it nor any of the subsequent revolutions of the 19th Century were able 
to bring order to the political life of the country. To Tocqueville it was 
only one continuous process which manifested itself in periods of intense 
activity broken by intervals of relative calm. He believed it to be the 
efforts of the French Nation in producing a democratic political system. 
This process of democratization was not only to be found in France; 
Tocqueville believed that it could be discerned all across the continent. 
Revolutionary activities and events were evidence of the process; as the 
old institutions were destroyed to make way for the new, Europe was 
moving toward an era of democracy. 
In order to acquaint man with the nature of revolution, Tocqu eville 
began to reflect and write upon the subject, especially as it pertained 
to the French situation. His major effort was to be an analysis of the 
French Revolution from its inception to his then contemporary period. 
He was able to finish one volume in this series before his health failed 
him; he died shortly thereafter, never completing the work. 
The one volume on the Revolution of 1789 which he did finish has 
been given various titles by the translators; it will be referred to in this 
paper as the Ancien Regime. This book concerned itself with the nature 
of French institutions prior to 1789 and the beginning of the French 
Revolution. In addition to this book, Tocqueville's Recollections also 
deals with revolution; here the subject is the Revolution of 1848. From 
these two books can be drawn Tocqueville's theories or ideas as to how 
and why a revolution occurs, the only result of his study which he was 
able to present to the people. 
He ordered his ideas as to the causes of revolution in a typology 
which he presented in his Recollections.1 It is never really mentioned in 
1 Alexis de Tocqueville, The Recollections of Alexis de Tocqueville, translated 
by Alexander Terxeriz de Maltos (Morningside Heights, New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1949), p. 64. 
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the Ancien Regime, but his approach is one which utilizes the typology 
presented in his earlier work. This framework set forth five major factors 
which were important in producing a revolution: the nature of a coun-
try's institutions (political, social, and economic), the nature of a coun-
try's mouers (its cultural essence), antecedent facts, the state of mind 
of a people, and chance. If social conditions were chaotic or "out of 
balance" when one considered the nation's institutions, mouers, or state 
of mind, then revolution would be a probable eventuality. Chance and 
antecedent fact were supplementary in that they added to but did not 
cause a revolutionary setting. 
Tocqueville applied this framework to the French Revolution of 
1789 and brought some understanding as to how and why this revolu-
tion came about. The purpose of this paper is to test Tocqueville's typ-
ology as a revolutionary frame of reference by using it to study the 
recent Cuban experience. Each of the five factors will be explained and 
then applied to the Cuban Revolution. An evaluation will then be at-
tempted to determine if Tocqueville's typology is applicable and useful 
in explaining the Cuban Revolution. 
II. THE NATURE OF CUBA'S INSTITUTIONS 
Tocqueville viewed the nature of a country's institutions-political, 
social, and economic--as the foremost determinant of revolutions. 2 He 
believed that a close relationship normally existed between the social 
and political institutions. This relationship was a kind of balance in 
which an elite occupied the top strata of both the political and social 
hierarchies. This was an aristocratic notion in that he regarded this class 
as an elite, but it was not to be an aristocracy based upon tradition or 
birth. It was to be composed of those who qualified according to power, 
ability, and the predisposition to use these two qualities in leading the 
people. This elite enjoyed social privileges commensurate with its social 
rank, but it paid for these privileges by serving the people as their 
political head. The enjoyment of privilege was intolerable if those who 
were privileged served no useful social or political functions, and a new 
and cross-referenceable elite would be created through revolution if it 
could not be created peacefully. 
Batista's government was characterized not by the fact that the so-
cial elite participated in it, but by the fact that the government was 
Batista. This condition was the product not only of the coup in 1952, 
but also of the very nature of Cuban political history. Fed erico Gil has 
2 Melvin Richter, "Tocqueville's Contributions To the Theory of Revolution", 
Revolution: Nomos VIII, edited by Carl J. Friedrich (New York: Atherton Press, 
1966), p. 77. 
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said that the condition of government in Cuba was the product of her 
political heritage, the temperament of her people, the lack of civic train-
ing, and the apathy and absenteeism of the most capable and best 
qualified of the citizenry; as a result politics went by default to the 
corrupt and inept. 3 The social elite had abdicated its political position, 
and ambitious politicians had filled the void with themselves. Batista 
would be included in this list of ambitious men. 
While it can be said that the Batista government was absolutist in 
that one man held dictatorial power to which all others were subject, 
it was still a government which reacted to some pressures. Batista knew 
that it would be extremely difficult to hold power without some legiti-
mizing support, and in order to provide this legitimacy, he created a 
political party called the Progressive Action Coalition shortly after his 
1952 cuartelazo. In addition, he allied himself with such groups as the 
Church hierarchy, labor, and business, and he also maintained a modus 
vivendi with some groups which normally would have been highly op-
posed to his government, such as the Cuban Communist Party. His main 
source of support continued to be the army, however. In return for their 
support, these various groups received satisfaction of their separate in-
terests, a situation which forced Batista to consider their wishes. 4 
While Batista's actions might have been based in part on popular 
pressures or the particular interests of his supporters, he was still a dic-
tator; what he decreed was what the government enforced. Such a form 
of government violated the principle set forth by Tocqueville when he 
spoke of the need for an elite which paid for its privileges by using its 
superior ability to• lead the people. The social elite, either because of 
Batista or its own unwillingness or incapacity, did not govern . This 
discrepancy demanded adjustment, but Batista's regime was one in which 
there could be no real inclusion of anyone else. The only access one 
could have to the decision-making process was indirect and subject to 
Batista's discretion. As Tocqueville believed it would, this lead to re-
sentments and revolutionary pressures. The social and political elites 
were not one, nor could there be any real movement toward this end 
while Batista remained in power. 
Apart from the political aspects of Tocqueville's concept of an elite, 
one finds that the society and its structure offered little mobility, a nec-
essary factor if the aristocracy was to be composed of only those who 
served useful social functions. The society was divided into an upper 
8 Federico Gil, "Antecedents of the Cuban Revolution," The Centennial Re-
view, VI ( Summer, 1962), p. 373. 
4 Rufo Lopez-Fresquet, My Fourteen Months With Castro (New York: World 
Publishing Company, 1966), pp. 14, 18 and 22. 
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and lower class whose boundaries were determined according to cultural 
and functional characteristics. Possibly the main social determinant was 
a consideration made as to one's economic function: those who performed 
menial tasks were members of the lower class and those who hired others 
to perform these tasks were members of the upper class.5 It was ex-
tremely difficult for a member of the lower class to reach a position 
where he no longer had to perform menial tasks, but even if he did, 
he had his aspirations blocked by cultural barriers such as education, 
tastes, birth, and other considerations. 
There was a middle-class which could be determined on the basis 
of economic criteria, but it was almost non-existent as a social class. It 
had no real sense of self-identification except possibly in the form of 
deeply felt resentments produced by its frustrations. It was found al-
most exclusively in the urban areas, and it was composed of salaried 
and skilled workers with some education, and of small shop-owners and 
other small-scale self-employed individuals. 0 It had moderate economic 
resources, but it aspired to be a part of the upper class, an aspiration 
that was usually thwarted. 
Politically and socially, then, there were individuals who were frus-
trated in their attempts to secure greater political power or social pres-
tige; this was done without regard to their qualities or abilities. These 
imbalances and frustrations produced, according to Tocqueville's typ-
ology, a revolutionary setting in Cuba. 
The economy and its strengths or weaknesses is the last consider-
ation found under the heading of the nature of a country's institutions. 
Tocqueville was a pioneer in hypothesizing that economics and politics 
were related. 7 He believed that if an economy were not able to meet 
the needs of the people, then the people would seek change in the eco-
nomic system; if peaceful change were not forthcoming, then they would 
turn to revolutionary change, and this meant political upheaval. 
The economic needs of the people might range from subsistence to 
continued prosperity, depending on their aspirations. What the people 
determined as their needs did not matter so much as that these per-
ceived needs be met. 
The Cuban economy was based on a monoculture-the growing 
and processing of sugar. Cuba was self-sufficient neither agriculturally 
nor industrially. To pay for large amounts of imports, she depended on 
the sale of her sugar crop in the world market, and especially in the 
5 Wyatt MacGa:lfey and Clifford R. Barnett, Cuba: Its People, Its Society, Its 
Culture (New Haven, Connecticut: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1962), p. 38. 
o Ibid., p. 39. . 
7 Melvin Richter, p. 120. 
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United States. Cuba's demand for imports rose, as did the prices paid 
for these imports, in the period from 1920 until 1959, but the income 
Cuba received from her sugar crop remained about the same ( her share 
of the world sugar market dropped, but rising sugar prices prevented 
an absolute decline in income from sugar sales) .8 This left Cuba with 
a balance of payments deficit and a seriously threatened economy. 
Diversification was needed to enable the Cuban economy to ap-
proach self-sufficiency or at least a position from which it could pay 
for its imports. Approximately two-thirds of the Cuban economy was 
tied in some way to the sugar crop,9 however, and the Cuban sugar crop 
had a strangle-hold on the available capital needed to fund industrial 
diversification.10 The rate of foreign investment in Cuba was not suffi-
cient to provide the funds necessary for diversification, and the need 
for domestic investment was made chronic. Since the sugar-growers 
opposed this, there was relatively little investment made in domestic 
industry, and the economy of Cuba stagnated. 
The most immediate failure of the economy to meet the needs of 
the people lay not in the way in which income was produced, however, 
but in the manner in which it was distributed. The upper-class was 
wealthy, and it became wealthier year by year. The lower-class was 
poor, and it would seem that it became poorer year by year. The per 
capita income in Cuba was one of the highest in Latin America, but 
many were extremely poor.11 
The rural working-class in 1959 lived under abominable conditions. 
Their work was for the most part seasonal; the sugar crop utilized their 
services for about five months of each year . For this they were paid a 
per capita income of $91.00 per year. This salary enabled them to live 
in an environment in which eleven percent drank milk, four percent ate 
meat, forty percent had tuberculosis or intestinal parasites, less than 
three percent had running water in their homes, and most lived in dirt-
floored huts or shacks without electricity. These figures are made more 
startling when it is revealed that they represent not only the peasants, 
but all, including the rich, who lived in the rural areas. 12 The plight of 
the sugar-worker was one which could engender deep resentments re-
garding the economic system. 
Those who left the rural areas to find work in the cities fared little 
better, if not worse. The Condereracion de Trabajadores de Cuba had 
8 Wyatt MacGaffey, p. 11. 
8 Nicolas Rivero, Castro's Cuba, An American Dilemma (Washington, D. C.: 
Luce, 1962), p. 74. 
10 Hugh Thomas, "Origins of the Cuban Revolution," The World Today, XIX 
(October, 1963), p. 452. 
11 Lopez-Fresquet, p. 24. 
12 Ibid., p. 10. 
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worked for years to better the conditions of the employed laborer. Be-
cause of its political importance, it had been relatively successful . The 
interests of the employed were protected to the extent that their gains 
were not economically rational; this worked to retard economic devel-
opment which would have provided more jobs for the unemployed. 13 
The unemployed were forgotten or ignored by the government. Esti-
mates of the rate of unemployment in the 1950's range from one-sixth 
to one-fifth of the total labor force of the island. 
It is obvious that the Cuban economy did not meet the needs of 
the Cuban people. Not only was the economy subject to dangerous 
:fluctuations, but a large segment of the population was forced to either 
work at rural jobs which paid very little or run the risk of finding no 
employment at all if they migrated to the cities. Tocqueville's typology 
would clearly indicate that a major portion of the people were ready 
for revolution upon economic grounds . 
From the discussion of the different facets of the nature of the 
Cuban institutions-political, social, and economio-Tocqueville's typ-
ology indicates that a revolution in Cuba was imminent during Batista's 
reign. 
III. THE NATURE OF CUBA'S "MOUERS" 
Tocqueville believed that any society had a body of opinions, emo-
tions, beliefs, and premises which were a product of a culture and which 
in tum created that particular culture. He called this cultural philosophy 
or essence the mouers of a nation. They were not static qualities to be 
described, but instead were dynamic forces or grand designs which 
impelled a people fonvard ( or conceivably backward). He believed that 
man needed these mouers in order to regulate his life and give it mean-
ing within the social context.14 
Since mouers were so basic to the ordered operation of the social 
system, there could be no conflict or competition between two or ·more 
differing sets. Such a situation within a country would produce two or 
more societies within its boundaries. This was incompatible, Tocqueville 
believed, with the concept of a nation under one political head. Revo-
lution was inevitable because the nation had to heal its schisms, and 
this could be accomplished only with the disappearance of all but one 
set of mouers. 
In applying Tocqueville's concept to the Cuban situation, it is seen 
that from the coup of Batista in 1952 until his departure from Cuba on 
New Year's Eve, 1959, the nature of Cuban mouers was one in which 
18 Ibid., p. 17. 
14 Richter, pp. 80-94. 
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revolution was an eventuality. Titis can be said to be so on the basis 
of Cuban attitudes toward and acceptance of the Batista Regime. 
At the time of the 1952 coup, "the greatest desire of the Cuban 
people was to have an honest government." 15 There had been a long 
history of revolutionary struggle for the freedom and efficiency of the 
political system, and the administration of Carlos Prio Socorras has given 
hope to these pressur es even though it had been somewhat corrupt and 
inefficient. The people had had their interests taken into consideration 
in the decision-making process, and elections had been relatively honest. 
This was realized and appreciated by them, and it became a part of 
their political culture in that they expected it to continue. 16 
"The sin of Batista was to thwart the high hopes of a new genera-
tion by a return, or rather a continuance without hope of reform, of a 
cynical and short-sided regime." 17 He had imposed himself and his 
policies on a people who desired to be able to choose their leader and 
the policies which this leader would implement. It was not a question 
of two different sets mouers opposing one another; it was instead a 
question of one man imposing his will upon a populace which did not 
regard him as legitimate. Because of this, the nation's mouers ( or at 
least their political content) called for public opposition to Batista. 
Since Batista would not surrender his power without a fight, a revolu-
tion, according to the typology, was the only recourse. 
Castro served as a point upon which much of the opposition to 
Batista could find a basis for effective action. The question arises as to 
whether fidelismo constituted a separate body of mouers in opposition 
to that which was generally accepted to by the Cuban people. Apart 
from the contemporary personalism of Castro, much of the fidelista 
movement was based on concepts, ideas, or values which were tradi-
tional; they were and had been used by most Cuban politicians to gain 
popular support. Such things as "governmental and economic reform" 
were trite in that they were voiced by many, but they were adhered to 
by few. It would seem that Castro's central position in the opposition 
to Batista was due not to his ideology but to the fact that he was a 
major opposition figure who commanded respect for non-ideological 
reasons. As such, fidelismo could not really be termed an ideology or a 
body or mouers. 
Titis view is not without opposition. George I. Blankston, for in-
stance, says that fidelismo was a rural movement against an urban 
15 Rivero, p. 65. 
16 Thomas, p. 453; MacGaffey, p. 124; and Lopez-Fresquet, p. 9. 
17 Thomas, p. 453. 
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Havana; 18 his argument is based on his observation that Castro set up 
his revolutionary headquarters in rural Cuba where "the back country's 
enemies of Havana :Bocked to him in an indigenous nationalism." 19 
Others have also found fidelismo to encompass more than trite political 
slogans and Castro's personalism. 
Whether or not Castro presented the people with a set of compet-
ing mouers is irrelevant in the sense that Batista's seizure of power was 
in opposition to the political mouers of the people. This fact is proof 
enough that the Cuban mouers were being frustrated. Since the mouers 
of a people are dynamic in that they guide the actions and reactions of 
society, there could be no solution to the problem until the conditions 
causing this frustration were destroyed. 
IV. CHANCE AND ANTECEDENT FACT IN CUBA 
Tocqueville believed that two supplementary factors of revolution 
were to be found in the events or conditions preceding this type of 
social action. These differed from his other classifications in that they 
encompassed all prior conditions not classifiable under the other three 
generalizations. These two causes were antecedent fact and chance. 
Antecedent fact was the term used to describe those events or con-
ditions which contributed to the revolutionary setting, but which were 
not causes for revolution in and of themselves. Antecedent fact made 
revolution a more likely eventuality by adding to the background which 
provid ed the people with their reasons for insurrection. 
Chance was the term used to describe an event or condition which 
enabled a revolution to occur. It did nothing which had not been pre-
pared beforehand, but it could provide the circumstances which would 
draw together those different pressures and frustrations that would lead 
to revolution. 20 
In applying the concept of antecedent fact to the Cuban situation, 
three major considerations stand out. These are Batista's seizure of 
power, his suspension of civil liberties, and the disintegration of Batista's 
army. 
When Batista seized power in 1952, he created perhaps the most 
basic antecedent fact. This can be said because his action did not add 
to a revolutionary setting, but instead created its raison d'etre. 
18 George I. Blankston, "Fidelism And Its Origin," Latin Am erican Politics, 
edited by R. D. Tomasek (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1966), 
pp. 359-362. 
19 Ibid., p. 361. 
20 Tocqueville, p. 64. 
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Batista's suspension at various times of the civil and political liber-
ties of the people also caused opposition. When Batista came to power, 
he suspended the Constitution and dissolved Congress. In the wake of 
public disorder after Cash·o's "History Will Absolve Me" speech, Batista 
was forced to suspend political and civil rights under a public order 
law which prohibited anti-government speech or actions. Later these 
acts were partially repealed. Elections were held and Congress recon-
vened, and the people had some of their civil and political rights re-
stored. These moves, however, were designed to create support for 
Batista while still allowing him to control the opposition to his regime. 
There were other suspensions of the civil and political rights of the 
Cuban people, and there were other "repeals" of these actions. Personal 
rights and constitutional safeguards were tenuous even while the people 
enjoyed the nominal restoration of these privileges. Arrests were made 
without regard to legality, and people were murdered and tortured by 
the authorities in defiance of all law, including that decreed publicly by 
Batista.21 Legality suffered most in Oriente Province and Santiago; it is 
interesting to note that it was here that the greatest opposition to 
Batista's regime was engendered. 22 
The disintegration of Batista's army is also an example of antece-
dent fact. Following the failure of the general strike which Castro called 
against Batista, the Cuban Govemment announced that "the rebel move-
ment was dying"; at the same time, the government ordered a massive 
army offensive to hasten this end. The offensive ended in failure; by 
Christmas, 1958, the rebels were in a position to move out of the moun-
tains and march on the towns. 23 
This came about because the army had disintegrated as a fighting 
force. The army had suffered heavy and demoralizing casualities in its 
massive offensive; these had come not in open fighting, but in ambushes 
and by sniper-fire. More important, however, was the fact that the army 
was a major tool of repressive force for Batista; this had caused a de-
cline in military morale, for as the government increasingly relied on 
repressive and brutal tactics to stop the guerilla movement, the soldiers 
increasingly became dissatisfied with their part in implementing these 
policies.M In addition to the dissatisfaction with the policies which they 
were expected to implement, the army was further demoralized by ru-
mors that some of their commanding officers were negotiating secretly 
21 R. Hart Phillips, Cuba: Island of Paradox (New York: McDowell, Oblensky, 
1959), p. 310. 
22 Ibid., p. 320. 
28 Rivero, _pp. 42-43. 
24- MacGaffey, p. 136. 
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with Castro. 25 Other high army officials were arrested and imprisoned 
for plotting to overthrow Batista and institute a constitutional govern-
ment , and this also hurt the morale of the army. 26 The result of these 
considerations was the collapse of the major basis of Batista's support. 27 
The seizure of power by Batista, and the subsequent suspensions 
of constitutional rights, served to anger and frustrate the people. In this 
way they added to the revolutionary setting. The disintegration of the 
army, even though it did not contribute to revolutionary feeling, did 
have an effect on Batista's political survival. It was antecedent fact in 
the sense that the army's ability was destroyed by its demoralization, 
and this contributed to the revolutionary setting by removing a major 
obstacle to the revolutionaries. 
Whil e the flight of Batista might also be considered as antecedent 
fact, it is a good example of Tocqueville's concept of chance. It was the 
opportunity which enabl ed Castro to seize power. When Batista fled the 
country, he left a power vacuum which Castro filled as rapidly as he 
could. 
Both antec edent fact and chance were then pr esent in the revolu-
tionary setting of Cuba in 1959. 
V. THE STATE OF MIND OF THE CUBAN PEOPLE 
According to Tocqueville, a revolution may come about when the 
institutions of a society do not fit its needs, or it may come about when 
the mouers of the people are in some degre e of conflict. In either case, 
Tocquevill e believed that the state of mind of the people must be of a 
nature which would allow the people to accept revolutionary actions as 
a means to promote or protect their int erests. This feeling might be 
latent or overt, but it had to be present. In its absence , what otherwise 
might be a revolution became no more than a coup d'etat. 
Batista's reaction to the revolutionary activities of Castro in the last 
years of his regime was to institute a reign of t error; this served to 
unite the people against him. Castro presented the picture of a "a David 
challenging Goliath", and this so caught the imagination of the people 
that they rallied to his support. 28 This was especially so in the rural areas. 
Castro's support in the cities came from the professional and white-
collar workers, as well as from the students. Originally his support had 
come solely from the young people who had engineer ed and imple-
2s Rivero, p. 43. 
26 MacGaffey, p. 244. 
2 1 Rivero, p. 29. 
28 Gary MacEoin, Latin America, The Eleventh Hour (New York: P. J. Kenedy 
and Sons, 1962), p. 99. 
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roented a terrorist campaign in his support after his return from Mexico.29 
Others had since been alienated by Batista to the point that they sup-
port ed Castro . Castro had the backing of most teach ers, writers, doctors, 
lawyers, engineers, and office-workers; these people formed what middle-
class existed, and they also formed a part of the upper-class. In return 
for their support , Castro espoused goals which corresponded to how 
these peopl e felt. so Political freedom , free elections, and social justice 
were synonymous with Castro and his movement. 
Havan a, however, had a large segment of its population which was 
pro-Batista. When Castro called a general strike in 1958, it failed in 
Havana because only a small part of the people supported the rebels. 
Havana was not like the rest of Cuba; "commerce and industry still 
clung to Batista" in the capital. 81 
By Janu ary 1, 1959, however, this had changed . Until that time 
there had been a great deal of political apathy, but now the people 
supporte d Castro or at least opposed Batista. 82 This quick change in the 
sentiment of the people "could only be explained by the national feeling 
of revulsion for the existing political habits." 88 
From apathy , the Cuban people developed openly anti-Batista atti-
tudes. While not all people supported Castro, most were united in their 
opposition to Batista. The state of mind of the Cuban people in 1959 
was one in which they were ready for revolution. 
VI. CON CL US ION 
Each of the five concepts in Tocqueville's typology prescrib es revo-
lution when it is applied to the Cuban situation. The nature of the 
country's institutions and mouers was such that change had to come. 
There were examples of antecedent fact and chance which added to 
the revolutionary setting. The state of mind of the people was one in 
which there was almost universal opposition to Batista. 
Tocqueville's typology does not, however, explain the Cuban Revo-
lution. It can be used to order the study of the chaotic conditions in 
Cuba prior to 1959, but the real revolution came later, and the typology 
is not applicable in this later setting. The major factor in the Cuban 
Revolution is the personality of Fidel Castro , a factor which cannot be 
fitted into the typology. 
29 Phillips, p . 291. 
so Rivero, p. 76. 
31 Phillips, pp. 352-353. 
32 Ib id., p . 383. 
38 Gil, p. 385. 
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A re-evaluation of the state of mind of the peopl e is important at 
this point for two reasons. First, the other conditions found revolution -
ary under Tocqueville's typology are conditions which can be duplicated 
in other countries. In these other countries , however, no revolution has 
occurred. In addition, those conditions were present in Cuba long be-
fore Batista was overthrown, but there was no revolution or ouster of 
Batista until the people were in opposition to him and were no longer 
apathetic. In other words, Batista was not overthrown until the state of 
mind of the people was one of open opposition, regardless of what 
other social, economic, or political problems existed. Second, the state 
of mind of the people was one which sought a democratic form of 
government, not a program of sweeping economic and social change . 
Castro took cognizance of this fact and initially present ed moderate 
goals for his movement. These two considerations indicate that the state 
of mind of the people was the determining factor which enabled Batista 
to be overthrown, but that it called only for a political revolution and 
not the social and economic revolution for which the other concepts in 
Tocqueville's typology called. 
The people received in 1959 what they sought in 1958; Batista was 
gone and a new government which promised democratic reform was 
instituted in his place. That even this was a revolution is questiona ble. 
Suarez says that if a revolution means a fundamental change in the 
institutions of a country, "then in January 1959 there was no revolution-
ary situation in Cuba." 3 4, At this time, Castro was simply a continuation 
of Batista and all the others who had controlled the island from time 
to time. He was just another military dictator in a nation whose history 
was characterized by political insurrection and military dictators. 85 That 
his support came from other sectors of society as well as from his Rebel 
Army does not alter this fact. 
The Cuban Revolution was more than just a change of those in 
power, however, as can clearly be seen by the changed nature of the 
society and economy in Cuba today. The answer to the question of why 
or how did the Cuban Revolution come about lies in Fidel Castro, an 
aspect of revolution not observed by Tocqueville. Castro's control of the 
revolutionary movement was a product of his charismatic leadership 
rather than institutionalized relationships. 86 In order to protect this char-
ismatic leadership, Castro opposed the "institutionalization" of his gov-
ernment or of his revolutionary movement. He sought to protect and 
34, Andres Suarez, Cuba: Castroism and Communism, 1959-1966. ( Cambridge: 
The M.I.T. Press, 1967), p. 34. 
s5 Blankston, pp. 352-354. 
8 6 Gil, p. 392. 
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strengthen his personal appeal to the masses. Suarez feels that after 
Castro became Prime-Minister in 1959, he either had to implement a 
return to the "democracy" before Batista or take a revolutionary path, 
a path that would justify holding on to revolutionary power. 37 Whether 
or not Castro was forced into it by conditions, be began unilaterally 
and incrementally to radicalize the revolutionary movement during 1959. 
In setting this process in motion, Castro used his personal power and 
appeal to initially obtain the program's acceptance by the people. 
This radicalization prev ented the institutionalization of the Cuban 
government in that Castro became the harbinger of a new social and 
economic order for the masses; elections were postponed, and rival 
power centers were rendered impotent. Through these actions, Castro 
not only maintained his personal power over and appeal to the Cuban 
people, but he may very well have increased them. This would be diffi-
cult to prove because be alienated much of the middle and upper classes 
whose support for him had been based on their desire to overthrow 
Batista and institute a democratic government rather than to embark 
on sweeping social and economic change. In any event, Castro main-
tained complete control over his revolution and his government by lead-
ing the nation into a program of social and economic change. The ex-
tent of this social and economic change was to form the Cuban Revo-
lution. 
As already stated, Tocqueville's typology does not explain why the 
revolution did not occur earlier ( either before or immediately after 
Batista's overthrow), nor does it explain why one man was able to 
bring it into being. The French Revolution occurred in the Eighte enth 
and Nineteenth Centuries, and the Cuban Revolution occurred in the 
Twentieth Century, but it would be foolish to expect their differences 
to end with that consideration. The result of Tocqueville's study of 
France is useful in that it provides general understanding about the 
social phenomena which are referre d to as revolution, but it cannot, at 
least in the Cuban example, explain the "how" and the "why" of these 
occurrences. This is something that perhaps must be determined by a 
specific study of a specific revolutionary situation, the same approach 
which, it should be said, Tocqu eville used in explaining the French 
experience. 
87 Suarez, p. 45. 
